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Analysing institutional partnerships in development: A contract between equals or a 
loaded process?  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Partnerships are complex, diverse and subtle relationships the nature of which changes 
with time, but they are vital for the functioning of the development chain. This paper 
reviews the meaning of partnership between development institutions as well as some of 
the main approaches taken to analysis the relationships.  The latter typically revolve 
analyses based on power, discourse, interdependence and functionality. The paper makes 
the case for taking a multi-analytical approach to understanding partnership but points out 
three problems: identifying acceptable/unacceptable trade-offs between characteristics of 
partnership, the analysis of multi-component partnerships (where one partner has a 
number of other partners) and the analysis of long-term partnership. The latter is 
especially the case for long-term partnerships between donors and field agencies which 
share an underlying commitment based on religious beliefs. These problems with current 
methods of analysing partnership are highlighted by focussing upon the Catholic Church-
based development chain linking donors in the North (Europe) and their field partners in 
the South (Abuja Ecclesiastical Province, Nigeria). It explores a narrated history of a 
relationship with a single donor spanning 35 years from the perspective of one partner 
(the field agency).  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The development chain linking donors and intended beneficiaries is summarized as 
Figure 1. The boxes to the left are the donors, those in the middle are the ‘intermediaries’ 
or field agencies and those at the right the intended beneficiaries. The term ‘partnership’ 
is often used to describe the desired relationship between the organisations in the middle 
of the figure with those to towards the left, while participation is often employed to 
discuss the desired relationship between those in the middle and on the right (Davies, 
2002). Each of the boxes of Figure 1 can comprise a diverse range of organisations, each 
with their own structures, procedures and mandate, and may include ‘non-governmental 
organisations’ (NGOs) as well as government organisations (GOs) and commercial 
organisations. Indeed, since the 1980s NGOs have become increasingly important players 
in the chain, especially in terms of development programmes implemented in less 
developed countries (Fowler, 1988, 2000; Bratton, 1989; Agbola, 1994; Tandon, 2000). 
In part this is because they are perceived as being able to ‘get things done’ faster, better 
and cheaper than government agencies (Smillie, 1995; Lewis, 1998). NGO staff enjoy the 
reputation of being highly motivated, and in a world where ‘value for money’ has become 
increasingly important as a mantra the rise of the NGO sector is understandable.  Indeed, 
the interaction of groups such as NGOs with government has provided a fruitful arena for 
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discussion (Young, 2000; Lister, 2004). Accountability pervades all components and 
flows of Figure 1, but donors at the left hand side of the figure are in a particularly strong 
position to impose rigorous management systems on those receiving resources – the 
“audit culture” of Townsend and Townsend (2004;  272). 
 
<Figure 1 near here> 
 
All sorts of relationship between the groups of Figure 1 can occur, and these will change 
with time (Davies, 2002). While the development relationships are often perceived in 
terms of state organisations and NGOs they are not limited to this. There are commercial-
government (Atkinson, 1999) as well as commercial-NGO multi-sectoral relationships 
(Chowdhury, 2004), as well as single-sector partnerships such as those between NGOs, 
GOs or commercial companies. But should all of these be seen as ‘partnership’? Indeed, 
as Fowler (1999) points out, “not all development relationships are partnerships. Nor 
should they be”. The problem is that the term partnership has such an appeal that it is 
indiscriminately used to cover almost all relationships. At one extreme the relationship 
could be nothing more than that of contractor and sub-contractor (Hailey, 2000; Mohan, 
2002). At the other extreme it could be more of a ”contract between equals” (Cox and 
Healey, 1998) founded on a more intimate and long lasting interaction with mutual 
respect (Lister, 2000). Some define partnership more tightly by stating that it is “an 
arrangement existing between two or more organisations [or individuals or institutions] 
in working towards a commonly defined goal” (Darlow and Newby 1997, cited in Davies 
2002; 191). The implication is that the partners agree on their defined goal (Brinkerhoff 
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(2002a, 2002b) and upon a rational division of labour which contours the advantages held 
by each partner (Anderson, 2000). It also stresses a need for mutual respect and 
independence (Larkin, 1994), so that one partner is not simply taken over by the other, 
and a vision that goes beyond a simple transfer of resources. Relationships founded on a 
one way transfer of money and nothing else are less likely to be seen by field agencies as 
partnership except to placate and mollify their northern ‘partner’ (Lewis, 1998).  
 
But if partnership is seen as the desired form of relationship in Figure 1 then  
 
 What advantages does the relationship bestow? 
 How best can relationships be analysed to check whether the form is a partnership 
or just rhetoric? 
 
It is these two questions that form the basis for this paper.  
 
The paper will begin by briefly reviewing the arguments often made for partnership in a 
development context. It will then critically explore some of the analytical approaches that 
have been taken for partnership. A central tenant of the paper is that the existing 
approaches to analysing partnership can provide a limited perspective, particularly for 
relationships that occur over longer periods of time (decades). The latter point will be 
highlighted by focussing upon the Catholic Church-based development chain linking 
donors in the North and their field partners in the South.  As the Catholic Church claims 
to be universal it’s northern (in the context of this paper these are donors) and southern 
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based development agencies share the same moral beliefs in a global community of 
equals. It is as well a community seeking lasting transformation with members open to 
learning from each other rather than just a temporary and ephemeral partnership created 
to deliver a single development project. As such the Catholic-Church chain is an example 
of a long-term partnership based on shared beliefs and morality which stress tolerance, 
respect for neighbour and a need to listen.  But what do some of the approaches to 
analysing partnership say about the relationships within the Catholic Church development 
chain? Do they suggest a contract between equals (Cox and Healey, 1998) or a loaded 
process (Mohan 2002)? 
 
 
 
WHY PARTNERSHIP? 
 
There are a number of rationales for the desirability of partnership, but at its simplest it 
could be a matter of maximising the probability of success in a development intervention. 
The argument is one of efficiency based on an assumption that it enables a more efficient 
use of scarce resources by utilising compatibility within the partnership network  
(Johnston and Lawrence, 1988). A donor can avoid the need to create and staff a regional 
office by working in partnership with field agencies which are also assumed to be better 
connected to intended beneficiaries (Mohan, 2002). Partnerships may also be better 
placed to ‘lever’ funding from government and multilateral donors such as the EU 
(Geddes, 2000). There may also be assumptions of mutual learning and sharing of ideas 
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(Postma, 1994; Lewis, 1998). Allied to these tangible benefits for forming partnerships is 
often recognition of global inter-dependences and a need for solidarity (Postma, 1994; 
Fowler, 1999).  
 
In many ways the popularity of partnership in development borrows much from the rise 
of public-private partnerships throughout the developed world of the 1980s (Hastings, 
1996; Power, 2000; Schofield, 2002). Efficiency and expertise from the private sector 
were combined with public interest and accountability, and fresh perspectives were 
brought to government services (Kolzow, 1994; Larkin, 1994; Woodward, 1994). The so-
called ‘Third Sector’ partnerships were not just about delivering better services in the 
short term but a desire for the partners themselves to learn and be influenced by each 
other. It has been argued that companies can gain much from such partnerships with the 
public or even NGO sectors such as a better image and influence on policy (Rundall, 
2000) and even helping to “challenge the private sector to adopt more ‘social’ objectives, 
less driven by short term gain” (Hastings, 1996; 262). However, the typical assumption 
was that the public sector partner had more to learn from the private partner (Hastings, 
1996). More sceptical views see such multi-sectoral partnership as possibly nothing more 
than a “search for a fix” (Geddes, 2000; 797). Atkinson (1999; 59) even goes as to state 
that: 
 
“…there is no single authentic mode of assigning meaning to terms such as 
partnership and empowerment, that their meaning is constructed (i.e. 
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produced and reproduced) in a  context of power and domination which 
privileges official discourse(s) over others”. 
 
Nevertheless, it is sometimes assumed that analytical methods of partnership in such 
multi-sectoral contexts are more advanced than with development chain partnerships and 
could have much to offer (Lister, 2000).  
 
A third strand to the partnership literature needs to be mentioned. There are studies which 
explore relationships within the private sector where there may be competitive 
advantages bestowed by partnership (Liedtka, 1996; Greenwood and Empson, 2003). In 
itself this is a large literature including suggestions as to how successful ‘partnership’ can 
be created and maintained (Bantham et al., 2003). Interestingly these include buyer-seller 
relationships as a form of partnership. 
 
Has partnership succeeded in its goal of helping us achieve ‘better’ development? The 
answer is often assumed to be an unequivocal ‘yes’ but surprisingly there is a dearth of 
literature which critically evaluates the performance of partnership (Davies, 2002). Case 
studies abound, including for example Wallace’s (2003) study of NGOs in the UK, but 
only a few studies seek to analyse the driving forces at play in the formation of a 
partnership, seeing how the partnership functions and the benefits (if any) it delivers. In 
short, there is a lack of analytical frameworks which allow partnerships to be dissected 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). Indeed much of the work in organisational theory to date 
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has focussed more on the identification of variation rather than explaining it (Greenwood 
and Empson, 2003).  
 
 
 
ANALYSING PARTNERSHIP 
 
A commonly expressed approach to exploring partnership is the analysis of power 
between partners (Saidel, 1991; Postma, 1994; Atkinson, 1999; Lister, 2000). An analysis 
of power is logical given that those with the resources (the donors) have the resources 
being sought by field agencies acting on behalf of beneficiaries (Anderson, 2000). 
Donors can stipulate terms and conditions that their southern partners have to match, and 
donors can do this in the name of accountability and ‘value for money’ (Fowler, 1998; 
Mosse, 2001; Mohan 2002). While partners are free to resist some of the stipulations 
being placed upon them, if they don’t want the money another may be only too pleased to 
comply as competition for funds can be intense (Smillie, 1995; Aldaba et al., 2000; 
Hailey, 2000), and some field agencies may be able to compete more effectively than 
others (Moore and Stewart, 1998). Much the same can be said of NGO donor 
relationships with government agencies in the north (Lewis, 1998; Wallace, 2003; 
Townsend and Townsend, 2004). As a result some understandably see partnership as a 
“loaded process” (Mohan 2002; 141), with the term helping to ameliorate uncomfortable 
inequalities in power between donors and field agencies (Anderson, 2000; Fowler, 1999, 
2000).  
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Lister (2000) provides an example of an analysis of power in partnership for a group of 
organisations in Central America, and set out a chain akin to the model in Figure 1: a 
funder (BD) – a northern-based NGO – a group of southern partners. She then applied 
Dahl’s (1957) four key constituents of a power relation to analyse the partnership: 
 
 Base of power ( the resources using to bring about influence) 
 Means or power (actions that can be taken to bring about influence) 
 Scope of power (specific actions taken to bring about influence) 
 Amount of power (the extent of the influence) 
 
Using this model, Lister (2000) comes to the conclusion that individual actors and 
relationships are critical in any partnership as it is through these that the four constituents 
of power are expressed. As a result she calls into question “much of the theory currently 
being developed for NGOs in terms of capacity building, institutional strengthening, 
scaling-up and diffusion of innovation, which all rely on organizational processes as the 
basis for change.” (Lister, 2000; 237). 
 
The analysis of partnership using just power can be criticised in that it assumes that 
almost all the power resides with the donor. But field agencies are not powerless, and 
Forbes (1999) has described examples where such agencies have made use of their 
closeness to the local scene (and knowledge of local-ness) to influence donor behaviour. 
After all, donors will typically know far less than their local partners about the very 
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groups they are trying to help (Lancaster, 1999). It is also worth stating the obvious - that 
donors need to work with good and reliable field agencies otherwise the raison d’etre of 
the donor is questionable. Also, not all development partnerships have a donor as one of 
the components. Chowdhury (2004) provides an example of a successful partnership in 
Bangladesh between an NGO (the Grameen Bank) and a telephone company. 
 
Interestingly, while discussions of power particularly in north-south based partnerships 
have been prominent, this has not been the case in studies of partnership in public-private 
relationships of the developed world (Hastings 1999).  One approach that has been used 
to understand how power differentials could play out within multi-sectoral partnerships 
assumed to be dialectical in nature (Atkinson, 1999), is to use critical discourse analysis 
(Fairclough, 1992). Hastings (1999; 93) argues that partnerships can be thought of as a 
“form of governance capable of ‘hot housing’ social change…….at least amongst those 
who participate in them”.  As a result of allowing for a dialectical relationship rather than 
a ‘one way’ process the partnership can be analysed by exploring the evolution of 
changes in assumptions, values and practice that has taken place since the partnership 
was founded (Hastings, 1996, 1998, 1999). A development chain example of a discourse 
analysis, although not expressed formally as such, is provided by Postma (1994) for the 
discourse between donors and NGOs in Mali and Niger. However, one needs to be very 
careful when using discourse to analyse power given the pro-partnership rhetoric, 
whether sincere or not, that one is likely to encounter from all partners in the relationship 
for different reasons. (Hastings,1999).  
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Another theory of interest is the adaptation of ‘inter-dependence theory’ (or perhaps more 
accurately ‘school of thought’) for individuals in close relationships such as marriage 
(Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). Here the partnership is not just a useful and temporary 
conjunction to fulfil an agreed objective, but one based on a longer-term interaction with 
a level of investment (Rusbult and Buunk, 1993). Inter-dependence delves deeper into 
understanding the basis for dependence – the way partners affect one another. While 
there are echoes here of the Dahl constituents of power relations, the debate goes deeper. 
Indeed, one advantage of this school of thought is its potential to generate a multi-
dimensional “taxonomic characterization of situations” (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003; 
370) as a first step in analysis. Bantham et al. (2003) borrow from interdependence theory 
to explore the partnerships between sellers and buyers. They posit what they refer to as 
mindset and skillset enablers in all relationships: 
 
 Mindset enabler. Awareness of tensions in relationships and a willingness to 
address them. The tensions may be endogenous and exogenous to the relationship.  
 
 Skillset enabler. Communication behaviours that facilitate the management of 
tensions. Borrowing again from the inter-personal literature Bantham et al. (2003) 
suggest that skills such as ‘non-defensive listening’, ‘active listening’, ‘self-
disclosure’ and ‘editing’ can be included here. It is perhaps no coincidence that 
some suggest “listening is at the cornerstone of effective partnership” (Ndiaye 
and Hammock, 1991; cited in Postma, 1994; 454) but the type of listening is 
important. 
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The two enablers are related, a willingness to manage tensions has to follow from an 
awareness of such tensions coupled with a desire to do something about them. Indeed it is 
possible to combine the inter-dependence and investment theories of relationships with an 
analysis of power within development chains. Clearly, for the mindset and skillset 
enablers to function there has to be a genuine commitment from donors and their partners 
in the field.  
 
Perhaps the most practically grounded analytical framework for partnership is that of 
Brinkerhoff (2002b) designed primarily as a tool to help with evaluation in a 
development context. After all, the point of the partnership is to generate tangible benefits 
(Davies, 2002). The effectiveness of partnerships in delivering benefits has received little 
attention, and care must be taken not to take the evidence presented by the partnership 
itself as the only evidence of success (Geddes, 2000). Brinkerhoff provides a detailed 
checklist of characteristics to help with evaluation of partnership performance. These 
cover the presence of pre-requisites and success factors, the practice or partnership and 
the outcomes of the partnership relationship. While the framework is complex it is useful 
in setting out the characteristics (indicators) to be looked for in assessing partnership. 
However, while all the indicators can be assessed for any partnership they may say little 
about the driving forces at play.  
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LIMITS TO ANALYSING PARTNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A MULTI-
ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
 
Given that the Lister (2000), Hastings (1999), Bantham et al. (2003) and Brinkerhoff 
(2002b) analytical approaches all address partnership, albeit in quite different contexts 
and from varied angles, it is not surprising that they can be combined into a single multi-
analytical framework (Figure 2). The four columns of Figure 2 represent the four 
analytical approaches, but there is clearly some overlap. The Bantham et al (2003) 
approach which dissects partnerships in terms of interdependency theory by looking for 
mindset and skillset enablers can help in exploring the issues of pre-requisites and 
practice identified by Brinkerhoff. They are also the basis of good discourse. The Lister 
(2000) and Hastings (1999) analyses of power relations, discourse and change in 
partnerships can also be mapped onto Figure 2  to help explain why some of the 
indicators identified by Brinkerhoff are as they are. The mindset/skillset enablers of 
interdependency theory can be used to explore partnership pre-requisites and practice and 
help with an understanding of power mapped via Dahl’s relations or critical discourse 
 
<Figure 2 near here> 
 
What trade-offs between the columns of Figure 2 can occur or indeed would be 
acceptable/desirable? Does a good partnership have to have all the elements of Figure 2 
pointing in the ‘right’ direction or can some aspects be sacrificed for others? For 
example, can discourse be less than perfect if the partnership delivers in what it is trying 
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to achieve? After all, it could be argued that the goal is not necessary ‘better’ partnership 
per se but ‘better’ development. The partnership is the means to the end not an end in 
itself.  
 
A further point is that in much of the literature partnership is explored between but a few 
organisations. In practice a single field agency may have a partnership agreement with a 
number of donors who may, or may not, have some coordination between them in terms 
of what they fund and their procedures. Similarly a single donor will have relationships 
with a number of field agencies for programmes and/or projects. Hence relationships 
have many components and there is an element of ‘partnership management’ in place by 
all parties. Just because the outcome of an analysis with Figure 2 applied to one 
relationship points to ‘poor’ partnership it cannot be assumed that a similar analysis on 
another relationship involving one of the partners would yield the same result.  Thus in 
order to analyse partnership it is necessary to both identify and explain organisation 
variation (Greenwood and Empson, 2003).  
 
A related concern to such multi-component diversity is the time-scale over which the 
partnership is played out. Most of the literature and case studies tend to deal with 
examples of relationship over relatively short periods – a few years. Over these time 
scales many of the institutional factors will be more or less constant. But while the 
separate analytical approaches of Figure 2 provide a useful basis for dissecting 
partnership at such ‘snapshots in time’ how do they play out for longer-term 
relationships?  While many of the components of a chain as set out in Figure 1can change 
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rapidly such that a field partner may have many different donors over 5 years, there are 
examples of longer-term relationships such as those found amongst the religious groups. 
As institutions change (e.g. in terms of priorities, agendas and personal relationships) 
then it is to be expected that an analysis based, for example, on the base-means-scope-
amount of power would generate different results throughout the history of the 
relationship. Similarly what if there are short periods where the donor does dictate 
process but on a larger time scale there is good discourse and taking a more functional 
analysis along the lines suggested by Brinkerhoff suggests that much was achieved 
because of the relationship despite any ups and downs? An analysis of discourse 
(Hastings, 1999) and inter-dependency (Bantham et al., 2003) could show much change 
over longer time scales, and a snapshot at one time could generate quite a different result 
to one taken just a few years later.  
 
These problems can be highlighted by exploring relationships within the Catholic Church 
development chain. The long-standing relationship seen within this chain would be 
expected to facilitate the application of inter-dependency theory as well as providing the 
necessary mindset and skillset enablers for true partnership. At least in theory, this might 
serve to heighten awareness of disparate power relationships along the chain.  But do the 
analyses of Figure 2 provide a consistent picture for the Catholic Church chain? If not, in 
what ways is the picture incomplete?  
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A STORY OF PARTNERSHIP IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH DEVELOPMENT 
CHAIN 
 
The specific Catholic Church development chain employed here is summarised as Figure 
3. It is the relationship between one of the diocese of Abuja Ecclesiastical Province, 
Nigeria, and one of the major Catholic Church-based donors of Europe. The relationship 
is in existence at the time of writing and therefore the diocese and the donor that form the 
heart of the story will remain anonymous in order to avoid any misunderstanding or 
prejudice. They will be referred to as the ‘diocesan development agency (DDA)’ and the 
‘donor’, although these rather stark titles should not in any way detract from the more 
charismatic characteristics of both groups; indeed neither see themselves as just a ‘donor’ 
or a ‘development agency’. 
 
<Figure 3 near here> 
 
Nigeria has one of the largest populations of any African country (currently assumed to 
be 120 million people). It is generally assumed that about 30% of the population is 
Christian, and roughly half is Catholic. There are 9 Ecclesiastical Provinces in the 
country, each led by an Arch Bishop and in one instance by a Cardinal, divided in a total 
of 49 dioceses, each headed by a Bishop. The Catholic Church development chain in 
Nigeria has a unique trajectory having much internal variation as there is no obligation 
for conformity between dioceses. But because of the universal nature of the Church and 
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the discourse that takes place within it there is a commitment to general policies that 
address underlying problems at particular times. To ensure the efficient delegation of 
authority each diocese in Nigeria has a Justice Development and Peace Commission 
(JDPC) headed by a JDPC coordinator. All seek funds from the same Catholic-based 
donors (and secular ones) for programmes and projects. Performance in each diocese 
depends on longevity, capacity and connections with the potential sources of assistance 
found mainly in the political and commercial centres in the country.  
 
Missionaries have tended to play a significant role within the JDPC system between the 
1960s and 1990s. Gradually the missionaries have pulled out as Nigerian religious have 
taken their place. By the turn of the 20
th
 century there were few expatriates (non-
Nigerians) in development positions in Nigeria. Indeed, in the view of the Arch-Bishop 
of Abuja Province one of the major problems faced by Catholic development agencies in 
the south is the need to replace an essentially volunteer workforce with indigenous 
people of equal caliber but paid on a salary basis.  
 
Abuja Ecclesiastical Province is located in the centre of the country, and comprises six 
diocese: Abuja, Jos, Lokoja, Makurdi, Idah and Otukpo. There are a number of reasons 
for selecting Abuja Province for the focus of the research reported here: 
 
1. Abuja Province encompasses the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria and at least in 
theory is the best placed of all provinces to have a strong interaction with Federal 
government. 
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2. Many aid agencies have their headquarters in Abuja, and again this facilitates an 
interaction with Abuja Province. 
3. Abuja Province has an interesting mix of diocese. They vary in terms of age, size (in 
terms of Catholic population) and composition, characteristics which could well have 
a bearing on their partnership with donors. Lafia Diocese, for example, is relatively 
young and has yet to have the time to establish a ‘track record’ in development, while 
Makurdi is much older and well-established. Some dioceses have their headquarters 
at the state capital (Lokoja, Makurdi) while others for example Idah and Otukpo are 
far from them. Such conditions could well have an impact in relation to interaction 
with State government. 
4. One of the older diocese of Abuja province is home to DDA.  While the mandate of 
DDA has remained constant, its form, function and official title have changed during 
the period covered by the story, but DDA is a useful umbrella term. Also, while the 
terms ‘diocese’ and DDA could perhaps be seen as interchangeable (the Bishop 
heads both) the distinction between the two will be kept in order to reflect the fact 
that the DDA is to all intents and purposes a self-managing organisation existing 
within the diocesan structure. The coordinator of the DDA is in effect the JDPC 
coordinator of the diocese.   
 
The narrative presented here covers a period of 35 years (1970 to 2005) and is only one 
and even part of the many that could be told. It is a story from only one side of the 
partnership (DDA) and told by three people (the DDA team) who have remained at the 
heart of the DDA for most of its existence. One of those helping to tell the story is the 
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only one to stay in the same post throughout most of the years and hence in the best 
position to provide a time-line. That person (a European) is the DDA coordinator of the 
chosen diocese. The other two members of the DDA team interviewed are the senior 
accountant and deputy coordinator (both Nigerian). Other actors involved in the 
relationship, especially those employed by the donor, have come and gone, and some 
have died. Therefore the behaviour and decision-making of the ‘donor’ (or more 
accurately the individuals within the donor whom the DDA team interacted with) 
presented here is very much as perceived by the DDA team. But while the story is only 
being told by one partner it is the one which has the most complete recollection of the 
events and, as will be seen, is also the one which has had the deepest sense of impact.  
 
The DDA began in 1970, just after the Nigerian Civil War ended, but the donor at the 
heart of the story was not contacted by the DDA until 1972. The initial desire of the DDA 
was to steer clear of donors as much as possible, including Catholic-based ones. In the 
words of the coordinator it felt that “the more you could do for yourself the more control 
you had over the situation”. Some technical assistance for agricultural projects was 
sought through the local Ministry of Agriculture, but it was only when this route proved 
inadequate that the DDA approached the donor for support with salaries and technical 
inputs. Although the assistance wasn’t huge the donor did request for an evaluation of the 
DDA as early as 1976 (some 4 years after their modest assistance began). Although the 
DDA had no control over this decision it was not antagonistic to the idea and saw it as a 
positive contribution. The evaluation was positive and recommended that more personnel 
and structures were needed to maintain the momentum. The donor responded to the 
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evaluation by offering to provide more support with salaries and basic facilities and the 
DDA readily accepted.  In retrospect this was the onset of dependency. 
 
A further evaluation of the DDA instigated by the donor took place 6 years later in 1982. 
The DDA was less supportive of this second evaluation because it coincided with the 
close of a major World Bank project within which the DDA had inevitably become a 
significant player during the late 1970s and early 1980s and was in the process of 
divorcing itself from this project. It was also a time of great political and economic 
upheaval in Nigeria as the economy was in rapid decline and Structural Adjustment was 
due to be implemented in the mid 1980s. Therefore the DDA felt it was an inappropriate 
time for an evaluation as any recommendations could be outdated by the time the report 
was published. But from the DDA perspective there was no negotiation. Understandably, 
the outcome was rather confusing as events did overtake most of the findings. However, 
it did result in a series of 3 year rolling plans with continued core funding (mostly in the 
form of salaries, administration and technical inputs) from the donor. Donor staff visited 
DDA regularly over these years putting no pressure for any particular activity.  
 
However, there were some less positive forces at play. The donor began raising a series 
of concerns relating mainly to the indigenization of the DDA which since its inception in 
1970 had been led by an expatriate missionary. As is usual with such situations the 
congregation concerned did have a plan for a replacement with a local member of the 
same order when someone suitable became available. The expatriate who set up the DDA 
would then move on to another country and plans were already in train for this move.  In 
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the late 1970s a possible local counterpart was identified and in training following a 2 
year apprenticeship with the DDA. However, this appeared to be much too slow and 
ponderous for the donor despite the fact that as a Catholic-based organization its 
personnel were familiar with the way in which missionary orders work. At the donors 
insistence a lay person was also sent for training with a view to taking on the role of 
coordinator. As well as creating an obvious basis for confusion so great was the pressure 
for immediate change despite repeated warnings from the DDA that adequate time and 
thought were not taken to select a lay candidate or to providing the necessary salary and 
conditions of employment.  
 
In the circumstances it is not unsurprising that donor pressure for indigenization was in 
the end counter-productive. While the missionary order tried to pursue its standard 
practice and recalled the expatriate coordinator with a view to starting up projects 
elsewhere the individual had to be returned to Nigeria on numerous occasions to continue 
the work for the DDA as it was simply not possible to find a lay replacement willing to 
work at the salary levels and employment conditions provided by the diocese. The 
position of the local member of the religious order also became confused and for a time it 
looked as though the order would have to pull out of the DDA altogether and reassign the 
individual concerned. The DDA team recalls this as a turbulent time that didn’t become 
fully stabilized until the mid 1980s when the religious order requested that the original 
coordinator take a longer-term commitment with the local member as a de facto deputy.  
By the later 1980s the indigenization pressure from the donor had more or less ceased as 
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it became clear to all that the result of the previous interference had been 
counterproductive. Planning for complete indigenization had to start again. 
 
Interference from the donor in the affairs of the DDA took another form in the early 
1990s. By this time there had also been changes in donor personnel, and the donor now 
seemed to be of the opinion that the DDA needed help with appropriate agricultural 
technologies. The donor felt that the DDA would benefit from sharing experiences with 
other Catholic development agencies it funded in East Africa. The DDA felt (rightly or 
wrongly) that it had little choice in any of these arrangements and was obliged for many 
years to carry out trials investigating the effectiveness of these technologies. Given that 
the technologies were adapted for very different socio-economic and environmental 
conditions in East Africa it did not come as a surprise to DDA when they proved to be 
futile and ineffective in the West African scenario.  
 
The third donor evaluation took place in 1997 and was again at its instigation. The results 
were again positive, but in the view of the DDA team the two evaluators contracted to 
conduct the evaluation had great difficulty in communicating the largely positive results 
to the donor. Neither was the DDA invited to discuss the finings with the donor. In 1998 
the donor cut its core funding to DDA without any discussion and this could have led to 
the total collapse of the DDA except for its internal resilience and inner resources which 
drove it to widen its income source base. Ironically although that period was hard the 
view of the DDA team is that the overall outcome of this experience was positive. It had 
learned many hard lessons; the first being it needed to get back to its original philosophy 
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to avoid dependency on any one donor. The donor base was widened to include other 
Catholic-based and secular organizations. The donor has since reengaged with the DDA 
and the relationship at the moment is far more positive. 
 
 
ANALYSING THE NARRATIVE OF RELATIONSHIP 
 
So what does this brief story, admittedly related by one side of the partnership, say about 
the nature of the relationship? The following is an analysis using the four frameworks set 
out in Figure 2. The frameworks were explained to the DDA team and the analyses 
presented here are the results of a discussion between the team and the authors. 
 
 
1. Power relations 
 
It was obvious to all that the experience narrated above can be mapped onto the analysis 
of power suggested by Lister (2000). The donor had the upper hand in that it had control 
over finance - the base of power. It also had the means of power as well as the scope of 
power (evaluation). The DDA allowed itself to become dependent upon the donor for 
core funding and thereby allowed an exacerbation of the power gradient. Both donor and 
DDA together allowed a substantial differential in power to exist and with it came the 
exercise of the power. The DDA did not have to do this – it purposefully chose that 
course of action beginning with its first involvement with the donor in 1972. Worthy of 
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note is that the donor was only too pleased to have the DDA as a partner, a point 
illustrated by its increasingly financial commitment during the late 1970s and 1980s.  
 
The power differential became increasingly tangible during the 1980s and 1990s, albeit 
with two different foci. In the 1980s it was founded on rapid indigenization driven by the 
donor while in the 1990s it was the provision of technical assistance to the agricultural 
programme which the donor thought might benefit from the experience of other East 
African partners. The climax to this exercise of power was when the donor unilaterally 
decided on the sudden removal of most of its funding for DDA. The DDA had no input 
into the process other than discussions with the evaluation team. Dialogue was 
conspicuously absent. Thus the picture which emerges from such an analysis of power 
appears to be stark and hardly one of partnership in any true sense of the term.  
 
 
2. Discourse  
 
If the relationship is explored through the presence of discourse then the picture is 
different. The view of the DDA team is that much encouragement was provided by the 
donor over the 35 years through visits and staff exchange sent by the donor for 
orientation to development. During this time there was exchange of ideas but at other key 
times discourse was patchy and inconsistent. The donor’s abrupt disengagement from 
core funding was not explained and from the DDA team’s perspective was difficult to 
understand given that the outcome of the evaluation was so positive.  
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But there were other times – indeed perhaps the majority of the 35 years - which the 
DDA team thought were characterized by extensive discussion and dialogue. Exchange 
visits were quite frequent and for certain aspects of the DDA’s work the donor was 
willing to listen and offer advice. In a sense discourse was compartmentalized; some 
issues, perhaps the majority, were open to discourse while others were not. Part of this 
was obviously due to the nature of the issue – some were clearly ‘non-negotiable’ in the 
eyes of the donor – but there were other reasons. During more than three decades the 
donor had three different desk officers for Nigeria and numerous other changes 
throughout the organization as a whole, while despite the turbulence the DDA had the 
same coordinator. Thus it is understandable that agendas and attitudes would change, and 
so would the basis for discourse.  
 
Therefore in the view of the DDA team should an analysis of power remain in isolation 
then a misleading and unjust portrayal of the overall relationship would emerge. The 
exercise of power which emerged at distinct times corresponded with a collapse in 
discourse. For other periods, indeed for perhaps most of the time, there was discourse on 
a wide variety of issues and both partners valued the views of the other.  
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3. Inter-dependence 
 
At one level there was no joint awareness of tensions between DDA and donor during the 
period when pressure was applied for indigenization. The DDA team felt that it tried hard 
to convey the problems as it perceived them. The donor seemed to believe that the DDA 
coordinator was in a position to appoint his/her own successor which as a member of a 
missionary order they were not. It led to much embarrassment and in retrospect most of 
the problems experienced at that time could be attributed to lack of adequate discourse 
brought about by the donor’s unwillingness to listen. The complexities of engaging with 
different missionary groups were not fully grasped; despite the fact that the donor was 
Catholic-based and was aware of the structures and decision-making processes which 
exist in missionary orders.  Of course the overarching problem of communication within 
Nigeria and beyond should not be underestimated. The nearest functional telephone was 
an eight hour drive away from the diocese. Change of desk officers and other staff at the 
donor severely limited institutional memory and in the view of the DDA team the 
obvious pressure of work in the offices of the donor all took their toll. Change in donor 
polices rarely became common knowledge. Therefore neither the ‘mindset’ or ‘skillset’ 
components of Bantham et al. (2003) for good discourse existed consistently over the 35 
years.  
 
Again at first sight this maps neatly onto the analysis based on power. However, in the 
overall picture of inter-dependence the situation is more complex. Much depended upon 
personal relationships between primarily the DDA co-coordinator and the donor desk 
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officers and this almost inevitably varied over the 35 years. At times the donor clearly 
valued its relationship with the DDA, as evidenced by the increased funding during the 
1970s and 1980s, and both parties showed good evidence of both mindset and skillset 
attributes conducive to partnership. Both organizations maintained their identity, although 
as we have seen there was an increasing dependency of the DDA on the donor for funds. 
But the donor also needed the DDA as a ‘flag ship’ for its activities in Nigeria and often 
quoted the DDA as one of its success stories not just in Nigeria but in Africa. It sent 
many people to visit the DDA to get ideas as to how it organized and managed local 
initiatives. However, communication problems did not help and neither did the change in 
desk officers. Thus inter-dependence varied considerably over the 35 years. 
 
As for institutionalization of mindset and skillset this simply did not occur. There was no 
institutional memory at the donor, and each desk officer came in with his/her agenda and 
personal attributes. Ironically much of this was apparent because the DDA did have the 
same coordinator throughout. If the coordinator had also been changed then institutional 
memory would have failed on both sides and neither would have been any the wiser.   
   
 
4. Functional/Performance 
 
During the 35 years of the relationship both organizations maintained their own 
distinctive identity – there was no attempt by the donor to take over the DDA or 
generally to tell it what to do on a day-by-day basis. Though interest waxed and waned at 
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times interference did not go beyond their efforts to promote indigenization (during the 
1980s) and inappropriate technologies during the 1990s.  When the donor decided to 
disengage from the DDA then mutuality was severely strained. Therefore in Brinkerhoffs 
(2002a) categorization the relationship was one of partnership. Also, the relationship 
between DDA and donor was highly successful as the donor provided funding (total or 
part) for the following: 
 
 A total of 10,000 farmer councils established across the diocese 
 25 rain harvesting projects 
 12 bridges and culverts 
 Was one of the major donors for a hospital of 100 beds 
 Helped provide a water supply for a midwifery school 
 Trained numerous hospital personnel (lab technicians, anesthetists etc.) 
 Funded training and a primary health care programme which reached some 20 
villages for 15 years 
 Helped with office buildings, archives and stores  
 Helped establish a 20 Ha seed multiplication farm in the diocese. This is also 
used for training and research. 
 The on-farm research programme has proven so successful that the improved 
crop varieties promoted by the implementer now cover vast tracts in the region.  
 
In that sense both partners met their objectives in a sustainable manner. The farmer 
council organization is self- generating and is currently in a second and third generation 
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of farmer group programmes. The donor hasn’t funded these latter programmes but its 
investment lives on as interventions have been founded on the original network and 
framework which it generously sponsored when such ideas were novel. The evaluation 
of 1997 highlighted this. For most of the 35 years over which this interventions occurred 
there was in the view of the DDA team a healthy discourse with the donor, and changes 
were made where appropriate and where both parties agreed they would be desirable. 
With the exception of the insistence to promote East African technologies during the 
1990s there was no attempt by the donor to impose decisions on the DDA in any of these 
activities.  
 
Thus in contrast to the previous analyses, particularly that based on power, the analysis 
based on the Brinkerhoff model shows the relationship between the implementer and 
donor as a highly successful and ‘true’ partnership. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
So what picture do these four analyses paint in understanding the relationship between 
the DDA and the donor? Do they point towards a contract between equals (Cox and 
Healey, 1998) or a loaded process (Mohan 2002)? The answer is far more complex than 
would appear at first sight from the narrative presented by the DDA team – the partner 
most deeply affected over the 35 years. At times an analysis of the relationship between 
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the donor and DDA based upon a power differential as suggested by Lister (2000) would 
appear to generate one answer – a loaded process – as the donor did have and exercised 
its power and partnership was all but absent. Yet at other times this did not happen. Base, 
means and scope of power may have remained much the same but the exercising of it did 
not. To be sure there were some critical periods when the DDA was undoubtedly 
frustrated and even angry with its partner, and damage did occur, but taken over the 35 
years even they were unwilling to say that power in the relationship was always a one-
way street. To them it really did appear at times to be a contract between equals. A 
functional analysis along the lines suggested by Brinkerhoff generates a descriptive 
picture as to the nature and practice of the partnership. However, this interpretation is 
undoubtedly one of partnership success as much was achieved. Who can say whether it 
could have been done any better given the turbulence in Nigeria over those years?  
Similarly, and probably unsurprisingly, the analysis of discourse (Hastings, 1999) and 
inter-dependency (Bantham et al., 2003) showed much change over the 35 years. A 
snapshot at one time could generate quite a different result to one taken just a few years 
later. Priorities, agendas and personal relationships changed a great deal. 
 
In a long-term relationship such as that represented by the DDA and donor it is to be 
expected that ‘ups and downs’ will occur. One also has to remember that this relationship 
was played out in one of the most economically and politically turbulent countries in 
Africa and took place over a period that included structural adjustment with that ensuing 
upheaval and international isolation. In itself this is hardly conducive to the sustainability 
of any relationship between a Nigeria-based partner and one overseas. It is perhaps not at 
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all surprising that analysis of the partnership yields different pictures of being a loaded 
process and a contract between equals  – after all 35 years is a long time.  
 
So are the four analytical frameworks of Figure 2 appropriate for such timescales? The 
answer has to be ‘yes’ in the sense that the points raised did resonate as being of 
importance to the DDA team. However, care does need to be taken. Snapshots can yield 
many pictures of the relationship but over the 35 years the vision is one of true 
partnership which had its times of discord and which ultimately resulted in a unilateral 
divorce. It lasted longer than many marriages, and when it broke down completely it took 
less than two years for the ex-partners to rediscover their appreciation for the each other 
and renew their relationship. While the DDA is adamant that it will no longer allow itself 
to become so dependent on a single donor ever again it clearly values its past relationship 
with the donor despite the problems. Similarly the donor clearly re-learnt the value of its 
past relationship with the DDA. As one member of DDA team said during the analysis: 
 
“Perhaps the best sign of all in true partnership is when both partners 
realize that they miss the other.” 
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Figure 1. Simplified version of the aid chain 
 
Bold arrow = flow of financial resources; Dashed arrows = flow of ‘technical’ information, advice and expertise.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The four analytical approaches reported in the literature for partnership. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Part of the Catholic Church development chain linking European Catholic-based donors to partners in Abuja Ecclesiastical 
Province, Nigeria.  
 
Lines indicate an interaction in terms of a flow of resource or information.   
 
 
